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Abstract: The study of neuronal specialisation in different cognitive and perceptual domains is important for our understanding of the
human brain, its typical and atypical development, and the evolutionary precursors of cognition. Central to this understanding is the
issue of numerical representation, and the question of whether numbers are represented in an abstract fashion. Here we discuss and
challenge the claim that numerical representation is abstract. We discuss the principles of cortical organisation with special reference to
number and also discuss methodological and theoretical limitations that apply to numerical cognition and also to the field of cognitive
neuroscience in general. We argue that numerical representation is primarily non-abstract and is supported by different neuronal
populations residing in the parietal cortex.
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1. Introduction
In today’s high tech society, numbers play a central role.
We use them to calculate budgets, compare prices, under-
stand food labels, and discuss journal impact factors. Not
surprisingly, difficulties in handling numerical information
can lead to serious impairments in everyday life (Ansari
2008; Butterworth 1999; 2004; 2005; Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh 2007; Parsons & Bynner 2005; Rubinsten &
Henik 2009; von Aster & Shalev 2007). Numbers can
come in many forms; we can represent the same quantity,
say “two” (here a word) as a digit (2), in Roman numerals
(II), non-symbolically as on a dice (††), with our fingers, in
a temporal series (e.g., a drum beat), or with other words
(pair, duo, brace) that carry semantic as well as numerical
meaning. The question of how we represent numbers and
whether there is a unitary neuronal basis for all forms of
numerical representation is therefore important. A full
understanding of numerical representation is also impor-
tant for the correspondence between comparative and
developmental studies that use non-symbolic represen-
tation and studies in adults that can use symbolic and
non-symbolic stimuli. Moreover, insights into the way
we represent numbers are proving to be important for
educational interventions, for diagnosis, classification,
and the design of effective rehabilitation programs for
people who suffer from numerical difficulties known as
developmental dyscalculia. For example, the way in
which some intervention programs are designed in order
to help children with dyscalculia (Wilson et al. 2006a;
2006b) is based on the idea of abstract representation.
Therefore, it is assumed that training on numerosity will
improve the numerical computation with digits.
2. The consensus
Over the last ten years a consensus view has emerged that
assumes the underlying representation of numerical infor-
mation to be abstract and to be focussed in the intraparie-
tal sulcus (Dehaene et al. 1998). Here we reassess this
abstract representation point of view. By abstract we
adopt the previous operational definition (Dehaene et al.
1998, p. 356) that “Adults can be said to rely on an abstract
representation of number if their behavior depends only
on the size of the numbers involved, not on the specific
verbal or non-verbal means of denoting them.” (See also
McCloskey, 1992, p. 497, for a similar definition.) Other,
more recent studies, support this view and point out that
“the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) as an important region for
numerical cognition . . . represents number regardless of
whether the input notation is symbolic (e.g., number
words or symbols) or non-symbolic (e.g., dot patterns)
and regardless of whether stimuli are presented visually
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or auditorily” (Libertus et al. 2007, p. 2). Therefore, an
operationalization of abstract representation in the
present article is that neuronal populations that code
numerical quantity are insensitive to the form of input in
which the numerical information was presented (e.g.,
digits, verbal numbers, auditory, numerosity, etc.). In con-
trast, we define non-abstract representation as neuronal
populations that code numerical quantity but are sensitive
to the input in which the numbers were presented. There-
fore, the neuronal populations that code the magnitude of
the digit 7, or the word “SEVEN” will not be identical.
However, the expected output for abstract and non-
abstract representations is similar. For example, for both
representations we know that 7 is larger than 6, and
SEVEN is larger than SIX. Nevertheless, we will show
here that non-abstract representation can be masked as a
function of the response made by subjects and that detect-
ing differences between different notations are optimised
by probing automatic processing. Such a difference
cannot be explained if the same neuronal population
codes numerical quantity independent of the input.
There are several ways to define representation (for
reviews, see Barsalou 1999; 2003; Markman & Dietrich
2000), but in this target article we define representation
only in the general sense that is most common in psychol-
ogy and cognitive neuroscience. Here representation
refers to patterns of activation within the brain that corre-
spond to aspects of the external environment (Johnson &
Munakata 2005). We differentiate representation from
processing; the latter includes representation, but relates
to the sum of pre-representation (e.g., visual identification
of the digit) and post-representation components (e.g.,
working memory, response selection). In the current
case numerical representation relates to patterns of
activation that are modulated by the numerical magnitude
conveyed by the number.
We suggest in this review that the commonly held view
of abstract numerical representation needs to be chal-
lenged; we present evidence supporting a contrary view,
and provide future directions for empirical work in cogni-
tive and developmental neuroscience.
3. Architectures for number processing
Models of number processing differ with respect to the
issue of whether numbers are abstractly represented.
There are many cognitive models in the field of numerical
cognition (e.g., Cipolotti & Butterworth 1995; Gallistel &
Gelman 1992; Noe¨l & Seron 1993; 1997; Pillon &
Pesenti 2001; Schwarz & Ischebeck 2003), but three
central models are the most cited and are representative
of the key features of different classes of models.
McCloskey and colleagues in a series of neuropsycho-
logical studies (e.g., Macaruso et al. 1993; McCloskey
et al. 1985; Sokol et al. 1991) have shown that a single,
abstract representation can provide detailed qualitative
and quantitative accounts of the errors made by acalculics
(patients with acquired numerical difficulties). These find-
ings led McCloskey (1992) to offer the abstract modular
model that is composed of three distinct parts: the compre-
hension system, the calculation system, and the number
production system. The comprehension system converts
different notations of numbers (e.g., digit, verbal
numbers, roman, etc.) into a common abstract format.
The calculation system includes arithmetic facts such as
the comparison task and calculation procedure, both of
which are also a form of abstract quantity code. The
production system produces the output in various notations
as requested, such as digits, or spoken numerals. An impor-
tant assumption in McCloskey’s model is that an abstract
internal representation carries out all numerical operations.
This implies that all inputs, without exceptions, are con-
verted into a single, modality-independent abstract rep-
resentation and then are translated into the appropriate
form of output. Consequently, the pattern of reaction
times (RTs) between digits, verbal numbers, or any other
symbolic notation should follow predictions based on
abstract coding, because they are translated into one
common representation. A general difference among the
overall mean RTs might appear because of different proces-
sing times of different notation inputs (e.g., digits are
responded to more quickly than roman numerals).
However, an important prediction that follows from
abstract coding is that there should not be RT interactions
between the different notations. Rather, the abstract coding
model predicts additivity between different numerical
notations when one manipulates factors which influence
the level of numerical representation.
While McCloskey’s model strongly posits abstract rep-
resentation, Campbell and colleagues (Campbell 1994;
Campbell & Clark 1988; Campbell & Epp 2004) have
suggested that numbers are not represented abstractly.
According to their encoding complex hypothesis, separate
modality-specific number codes exist. Therefore, number
processing is mediated by modality-specific processes
(e.g., visual, digit) and not by an abstract code. Conse-
quently, they predict RT interactions between responses
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to numbers as a function of notation or stimulus modality.
More precisely, they do not predict any additivity between
different numerical notations; rather, they predict an
interaction between notation and factors that are influ-
enced by the numerical representations.
Dehaene (1992) combined features of the abstract
modular model and the encoding complex hypothesis
and composed the currently most accepted cognitive
model: the triple-code model. Similar to the encoding
complex hypothesis, this model does not assume a single
central number representation. Instead, it assumes that
there are three different codes with special and distinct
functions for each. The first two codes are modality- and
notation-dependent; The Arabic code, which resides in
the left and right inferior ventral occipital-temporal
areas, is responsible, for example, for multi-digit calcu-
lations. Simple calculations, verbal counting, and retrieval
of arithmetic facts are executed via a verbal code, which is
subserved by the left perisylvian area. However, numerical
comparison and number approximation, which access the
numerical representation, are performed using the third
code, the analogue magnitude code, in which the rep-
resentation, as in McCloskey’s model (1992), is modality-
and notation-independent. Hence, it is possible to find
notation-dependent processing for arithmetic operations
resulting from non-representation–related processes
outside the analogue magnitude code (e.g., verbal code),
while the numbers in the equation are represented
abstractly by the analogue magnitude code. Therefore,
this model, like the abstract modular model, predicts addi-
tivity between different numerical notations when one
manipulates factors that influence the level of numerical
representation. This idea was mentioned in several later
works, for example, in Dehaene (1996) where the author
writes “the same representation of number magnitudes
should be accessed regardless of input number notation”
(p. 60). In later works, which marked the transition of
the abstract view from a purely psychological concept to
a neurally instantiated one, it was stated that the IPS
codes the abstract, rather than non-abstract, quantity
meaning. For example, after reviewing neuroimaging
studies, Dehaene and colleagues concluded that, “Those
parametric studies are all consistent with the hypothesis
that the HIPS [horizontal IPS] codes the abstract quantity
meaning of numbers rather the numerical symbols them-
selves.” (Dehaene et al. 2003, p. 492).
4. Numbers are abstract
The logic behind the idea that numbers are represented in
an abstract fashion can be examined in a straightforward
way. If numerical representation is abstract, then the rep-
resentation-related effects caused by one type of notation
or modality should be identical for other notations or in
other modalities. That is, the effect for each notation or
modality should be additive, rather than interacting with
the notation. Such effects have been observed for a
variety of notations and modalities both at the behavioural
(e.g., Barth et al. 2003; Dehaene & Akhavein 1995;
Naccache & Dehaene 2001b; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000) and the neuronal level (e.g., Dehaene 1996; Eger
et al. 2003; Libertus et al. 2007; Naccache & Dehaene
2001a; Pinel et al. 2001), thus supporting the idea that
numbers are represented abstractly. The spatial numerical
association of response codes (SNARC) effect is a classic
example; subjects respond more quickly to small
numbers with left-hand key responses than with right-
hand key responses, and faster to large numbers with
the right-hand key than with the left-hand key (e.g.,
responding to digit 3 will be faster with the left-hand
key, whereas responding to digit 8 will be faster with the
right-hand key) (Dehaene et al. 1993; Fias & Fischer
2004; Gevers & Lammertyn 2005; for a recent meta-analy-
sis see Wood et al. 2008). The effect is independent of
notation or modality (Nuerk et al. 2005; see also our
Figure 1a). Similarly, in the numerical distance effect,
RT increases as the numerical distance between two
numbers decreases (e.g., RT to decide if 8 is larger than
2 is faster than RT to decide if 8 is larger than 6) (Moyer
& Landauer 1967). This effect too, by and large, is inde-
pendent of notation (Dehaene 1996; Dehaene & Akhavein
1995; Naccache & Dehaene 2001b; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000) (see our Figure 1b). These and other cognitive
effects gave support for the triple code model (Dehaene
1992). Extrapolating the idea of abstractness from this
cognitive model (Dehaene 1992) to the nervous system
implies that within the IPS, the area most associated
with numerical representation (see Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008f; Dehaene et al. 2003, for reviews and meta-
analyses), the same neural population will be recruited
to encode numerical quantity, whatever the format of
presentation. Neuroimaging experiments have reported
notation- and modality-independent brain activation in
the IPS (Eger et al. 2003; Naccache & Dehaene 2001a;
Pinel et al. 2001; see also Venkatraman et al. 2005, for evi-
dence of format-independent processing of exact and
approximate arithmetic in the IPS) (see our Figure 1c).
Together these findings, both at the behavioural and the
neuronal level, provide an apparently strong basis for the
abstract representation of numbers. However, there are
several limitations to this view.
5. Numbers are not abstract
Despite the evidence presented in the previous section,
the logic behind the assumption that numbers are rep-
resented in an abstract fashion is incomplete and suffers
both from methodological and theoretical shortcomings.
While it is true that different notations/modalities can
yield similar behavioural effects, it does not follow that
they therefore share a single neuronal representation. It
is entirely possible, for example, that similar behavioural
effects can be subserved by different brain areas, or neur-
onal populations in a single brain area, and in different
time windows (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007a; Rumelhart &
McClelland 1986). It is also often overlooked that, at
the behavioural and neural levels, the assumption that
numbers are represented in an abstract fashion is based
mainly on null results, that is, on finding no differences
between notation or modality and the behavioural or
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) variable that
correlates with numerical representation. Therefore, the
conclusion that numbers are abstract may be due to a
lack of statistical power, or the insensitivity of the para-
digms used. Indeed, some studies have found differences
or a tendency towards a difference between notations
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh: Numerical representation in the parietal lobes
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(e.g.,digits, verbalnumbers,numerosity,Mandarinnumerals)
(Campbell & Epp 2004; Dehaene 1996; Dehaene &
Akhavein 1995; Droit-Volet et al. 2008; Ganor-Stern &
Tzelgov 2008; Koechlin et al. 1999; Reynvoet & Ratinckx
2004) or modalities (i.e., visual or auditory) (Barth et al.
2003), but the implications of most of these results have
either been ignored, or alternative explanations have been
given that leave the idea of non-abstract representations
unchallenged.
In addition to the fact that similar behavioural effects
can be produced by different mechanisms (Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2007a; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), at
the neuronal level, similar brain activations can stem
from different neuronal populations that are co-localised
within a single imaged voxel (volumetric pixels) and
cannot be segregated with conventional neuroimaging
techniques (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007b; Grill-Spector
et al. 2006b; Nieder 2004). In other words, in the parietal
lobes each voxel that is activated is sampled during the
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) exper-
iment (with a spatial resolution of  3 cubic mm) and
contains about 1.25 million neurons (Pakkenberg &
Gundersen 1997). Moreover, the neurons in this voxel
can fire tens of impulses per second for different functions.
However, different functions cannot be detected, as the
fMRI signal – which indicates an increase in oxygenated
blood bringing energy to active neurons – develops slug-
gishly, over several seconds. Therefore, observing similar
activations at the voxel level for different notations (Pinel
et al. 2001) or modalities (Eger et al. 2003), or alterna-
tively, observing similar time courses in event-related
potentials (ERP) experiments that lack spatial resolution
(Dehaene 1996; Libertus et al. 2007), is not sufficient to
indicate abstract representation. This theoretical point is
gaining experimental support from single-cell neurophysiol-
ogy in monkeys. It has been shown, for example, that
neurons that are sensitive to numbers, are also sensitive to
features that have little to do with magnitude information
(Nieder et al. 2006; see also Calabrese 2007). Note that
such a finding, although not speaking directly against the
idea of abstract numerical representation, challenges
the idea that numerical or magnitude representation is
modular (Dehaene et al. 1998; McCloskey 1992). Indeed
modular representation of any single class of stimulus fea-
tures of the world does not have a good history. Suggestions
that the monkey or human brain contained a colour centre
(Lueck et al. 1989; Zeki 1980), a motion centre (Zeki 1974),
or a word form area (Cohen et al. 2000; McCandliss et al.
2003) – all good cases for attributes of the external world
that one might expect to have a single locus of representa-
tion – have been found wanting; and each of these attri-
butes has been found either to be multiply represented
for different task demands at almost every level of the visuo-
cognitive system (cf. Orban et al. 1996; Otten & Rugg 2001;
Watanabe et al. 1998) or the “centre” has been found to be
not specific to the attribute (cf. Merigan 1996; Price &
Devlin 2003; Xue & Poldrack 2007). A priori, number infor-
mation – which is less constrained than simple object
features such as colour, form, and motion, and upon
which we perform explicit and implicit computations –
would seem to be a poorer candidate for a canonical
representation.
Numerical representation is also modulated by task and
automaticity. Various definitions have been attributed to
Figure 1. Effects that underlie the idea that numerical
representation is abstract. (A) The SNARC effect for different
notations (digits, words, dice) and modalities (visual, auditory).
In this experiment the subjects were instructed to decide
whether a numerical stimulus is odd or even (i.e., parity
judgement) by pressing the right or the left response key (key
assignment was counterbalanced within subjects). The slopes
that were obtained are independent of format. (B) The Distance
effect for digits and words shows the same function independent
of notation. In this experiment subjects were asked to decide by
a button press whether the displayed number (i.e., the numbers
1 to 9, excluding the number five) is numerically larger or
smaller than the standard number five. (C) Brain activation in
the IPS (in orange circles) is modulated in similar ways as a
function of the numerical distance between the compared digits,
independent of the notations that were used (i.e., words or
digits). Left IPS appears on the left side, right IPS appears on
the right side. In this experiment the subjects decided whether a
visually presented number was larger or smaller than a fixed
reference number (65) by pressing a button with their right or
left hand according to instructions. Adapted from Nuerk et al.
(2005), Pinel et al. (2001), and Schwarz and Ischebeck (2000)
with permission. A color version of this figure is available online
at www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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the concept of “automaticity” (e.g., Carr 1992; Hasher &
Zacks 1979; Logan 1985; Posner 1978). In the current
article, we adopt Tzelgov et al.’s (1996) definition (see also
Barge 1992) that a process is automatic if it does not need
monitoring to be executed. Most studies that support the
idea of an abstract representation are based on subjects car-
rying out intentional processing of numerical information.
However, numbers are also represented automatically
(for a review, see Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005). Automatic
and intentional processing can lead to very different infer-
ences about the underlying representation (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2008b; 2008g; Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005), and
brain activity (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007a, Lewis & Miall
2003; Orban et al. 1996). Indeed, task-dependency is a
fundamental feature of brain representation and has been
reported at every level of every perceptual and cognitive
domain, including time perception (Lewis & Miall 2003),
magnitude processing (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008c), face
processing (Cohen Kadosh et al., in press), and visual
processing (Orban et al. 1996). Mental representations can
be probed when they are engaged by task demands or
when their processing is automatic. The advantage of
using automatic processing is that processing and behaviour
are unaffected by task demands and intentional strategies
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; 2008g; Tzelgov & Ganor-
Stern 2005).
This might imply that specific task requirements may
induce humans to generate different representations
(e.g., shared representation for different notations).
Clearly, humans can generate numerical representations
according to task requirements (Bachtold et al. 1998;
Fischer & Rottmann 2005; Gertner et al. 2009; Hung
et al. 2008; Lindemann et al. 2008; Shaki & Fischer
2008; Shaki & Petrusic 2005). For example, Bachtold
et al. (1998), in a numerical comparison task of the
numbers 1 to 11 (excluding the number 6 which serves
as the standard), found that subjects showed a normal
SNARC effect when they conceived the numbers as dis-
tances on a ruler, which represents small numbers on
the left and larger numbers on the right. Importantly,
the SNARC effect was reversed (i.e., faster responses to
small numbers with right-hand key responses than with
left-hand key responses, and faster responses to large
numbers with the left-hand key responses than with the
right-hand key responses) when the subjects conceived
the numbers as hours on a clock face, which presents
small numbers on the right side, and large numbers on
the left side. Thus, a limit to the abstract representation
view we have to face is that observations consistent with
shared representations may be true only for specific task
conditions in any given experiment.
Clearly, then, the evidence that numbers are abstractly
represented has several limitations: null results (Cohen
Kadosh 2008a; Dehaene 1996; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000; Shuman & Kanwisher 2004), technical limitations
(Ansari 2008; Nieder 2004), and task specificity (Ansari
2007; Ansari et al. 2006a; Bachtold et al. 1998; Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2008b; Go¨bel et al. 2004; Van Opstal et al.
2008a; Venkatraman et al. 2005; Wood et al. 2006a). In
the next section, we provide evidence that directly chal-
lenges the idea that numbers are represented abstractly.
The line of experiments we turn to next shows that non-
abstract representations exist in a variety of tasks and
cultures.
6. Two= II and 2 does not equal two
Given the ubiquity and importance of numbers and the
early stage in life at which we learn about them, it is not
surprising that, like words, they are eventually over-
learned and processed automatically. Automatic numeri-
cal processing is an important ability that exists not only
in human adults (Cohen Kadosh 2008b; Cohen Kadosh
& Henik 2006; Dormal et al. 2006; Fias et al. 2001a;
Henik & Tzelgov 1982; Lammertyn et al. 2002; Pavese
& Umilta` 1998; Schwarz & Heinze 1998; Schwarz &
Ischebeck 2003; Tzelgov et al. 1992; Verguts & Van
Opstal 2005), but also in children (Gebuis et al. 2009;
Girelli et al. 2000; Mussolin & Noel 2007; Rubinsten
et al. 2002; Szucs et al. 2007; Zhou et al. 2007), and
animals (Washburn 1994). The automaticity of numerical
information processing gives one the opportunity to
explore numerical representation per se, independent of
one’s strategies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008g; Ganor-
Stern & Tzelgov 2008; Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005).
Automaticity has been explored mainly by using conflict
tasks, for example, the size congruity paradigm. Usually,
in this paradigm subjects are presented with two digits
on the computer screen (one digit in the left visual field,
and one digit in the right visual field) and are required
to compare the stimuli according to their physical
size while ignoring their numerical value (e.g., 2 4), and
to press the button that corresponds to the side of the
physically larger stimulus (Cohen Kadosh 2008b; Cohen
Kadosh & Henik 2006; Gebuis et al. 2009; Girelli et al.
2000; Henik & Tzelgov 1982; Mussolin & Noel 2007;
Rubinsten & Henik 2005; 2006; Rubinsten et al. 2002;
Schwarz & Heinze 1998; Schwarz & Ischebeck 2003;
Szucs et al. 2007; Tzelgov et al. 1992; Verguts & Van
Opstal 2005; Zhou et al. 2007). The stimuli can be incon-
gruent (the physically larger digit is numerically smaller;
e.g., 2 4), neutral (the stimuli differ only in the relevant
dimension; e.g., 2 2), or congruent (the physically larger
digit is also numerically larger; e.g., 2 4). A common
finding is that incongruent trials, being slower to process
than congruent trials (size-congruity effect), as reflected
by slower RT, indicate that the numerical information
is processed automatically. This paradigm has been
employed in behavioural studies and has yielded an inter-
action between different notations and automatic proces-
sing of numerical information (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008e; Ito & Hatta 2003). For example, Ito and Hatta
(2003) found that when participants compared the
physical size of Kana scripts – the equivalent of verbal
numbers – numerical information was not processed
automatically. Therefore, the irrelevant numerical infor-
mation did not interfere with the relevant physical size
judgement. In contrast, when the same participants com-
pared digits or Kanji numbers (ideographic script), a
size-congruity effect was observed, thus indicating that
the numerical information was processed automatically,
and interfered the relevant physical size judgement.
Similar results were found and extended by another
laboratory (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e).
A recent study used a simple comparison task in which
subjects had to compare the numerical values of digits or
verbal numbers while examining the effect of numerical
information in trial n – 1 on processing of numerical infor-
mation in trial n (i.e., sequential effect) (Cohen Kadosh
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh: Numerical representation in the parietal lobes
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2008a). Others conducted a similar analysis on a similar
numerical task (Dehaene 1996; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000) and similar stimuli (Dehaene 1996), and did not
find an interaction between notation and the distance
effect or differential effects of trial n – 1 on trial n as a
function of notation. However, these studies used a long
response-to-stimulus-interval (RSI) (.1,500 msec),
which is likely to produce expectancy effects (Soetens
1998), whereas automatic processing occurs under short
RSI conditions (e.g., 200 msec) (see Neely [1977] for a
similar idea for priming tasks). By using a short RSI of
200 msec, and a large number of subjects and trials,
three results emerged which support the idea that
non-abstract representations of numbers exist: (1) an
interaction between notation and numerical distance in
reaction time; (2) an interaction between notation, nota-
tion repetition, and numerical distance in error rates;
and (3) an interaction between notation and the distance
between the numerical distance in trial n – 1 and trial n
with reaction time as the dependent variable (Cohen
Kadosh 2008a).
Dehaene and Akhavein (1995) used a same-different
task, in which participants were asked to decide via a
button press whether two members of a pair of stimuli,
which are presented simultaneously, were the same or
different. The notations were digit-digit (e.g., 2-2, 2-8),
verbal number-verbal number (e.g., TWO-TWO, TWO-
EIGHT), or a mixed notation (e.g., verbal number-digit;
TWO-2, TWO-8). When the subjects compared the simi-
larity of the numbers according to their numerical values, a
distance effect independent of notation was observed. In
contrast, in physical matching, when the participants com-
pared the numbers according to their perceptual simi-
larity, an interaction between notation and the distance
effect was observed with a flat and not significant distance
effect for mixed notation. Although the latter finding
indicates that numerical representation is non-abstract,
because numerical processing should be observed inde-
pendent of the input (i.e., mixed notation vs. pure nota-
tion), Dehaene and Akhavein (1995) argued that
numbers, whether digits or verbal, converge towards a
common semantic representation.
In a recent study, Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov (2008) con-
ducted two experiments: one with a same-different task
and another with the size congruity paradigm. The
same-different experiment was similar to Dehaene and
Akhavein’s (1995) study but with Indian numbers (a differ-
ent notation for numbers that is used mostly in Arabic-
speaking countries) instead of verbal numbers. In the
physical comparison task they were not able to replicate
the distance effect for digits, Indian numbers, or mixed
notation. However, they argued that numbers were still
processed automatically by finding what they called the
“value interference effect,” that is, processing the
numbers’ numerical value impaired participants’ “differ-
ent” responses to different-notation pairs with the same
numerical values (e.g., 8 in digit notation vs. 8 in Indian
notation) compared with those with different numerical
values (e.g., 8 in digit notation vs. 2 in Indian notation).
However, this effect does not indicate semantic processing
and it can be attributed to asemantic transcoding (e.g., due
to phonological representation). In this case, the digit 8
and the Indian number 8 were recognized as representing
the same numbers, even though the numerical
representation was not accessed (see Dehaene & Akhavein
1995, for a discussion on this scenario). Indeed, the lack of
distance effect in Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov’s (2008) exper-
iment supports the idea that numerical information did
not reach the level of the semantic representation. In
another experiment, Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov found that
digits, Indian numbers, and mixed-notation (digit and
Indian numbers) caused interference to a physical size
judgment, as reflected by the size-congruity effect.
Again, they argued that this effect indicates abstract rep-
resentation. However, one should note that the level of
the interference interacted with notation, as well as with
the numerical distance, thus replicating the findings by
Ito and Hatta (2003) and Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008e).
This result can be explained not as a result of abstract
representation, but simply an interference during
response selection, as was shown in several ERP and
fMRI studies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007c; 2008d; Szu´´cs
& Solte´sz 2007; Szu´´cs et al. 2007). Moreover, in another
experiment, when subjects were asked to compare pairs
of numbers for their numerical value, Ganor-Stern and
Tzelgov found that the distance effect was modulated as
a function of notation (i.e., interaction between notation
and distance effect).
Together, these interactions provide results which cannot
be explained by assuming an abstract representa-
tion – therefore challenging the central idea that numbers
are processed in an abstract fashion, as was strongly
suggested by the different architectures for numerical cog-
nition (e.g., the abstract modular model [McCloskey 1992]
and the triple-code model [Dehaene 1992] discussed
earlier). Nevertheless, Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov (2008,
p. 430) reached the conclusion that: “different notations
are automatically translated into a common representation
of magnitude, in line with M. McCloskey’s (1992) abstract
representation model.” However, as we have shown, exam-
ination of the details of their results does not allow one to
conclude that numerical representation is abstract; rather,
it seems to strongly support our view that numerical
representation is not abstract.
In another study (Droit-Volet et al. 2008) 5-year-olds, 8-
year-olds, and adults participated in a number bisection task
in which numbers were presented sequentially to one group
of participants or simultaneously to another group of par-
ticipants. In this task, the subjects are trained to discrimi-
nate a “few” standard (e.g., 8 dots) from a “many”
standard (e.g., 20 dots). They were then presented with
comparison stimuli that contain intermediate values (e.g.,
12 dots) or values equal to the standard, while being
asked to decide if the comparison stimuli is more similar
to the few or many standard. They found that the mode
of presentation yielded different Weber-ratios (which indi-
cate the sensitivity to discriminate two numbers). Namely,
the Weber-ratio was larger during sequential presentation
of numerical quantity compared to simultaneous presen-
tation, and this difference was highly significant for adults
and 8-year-old participants, and showed only a trend in
the case of 5-year-old children. Importantly, this study, as
in the study by Cohen Kadosh (2008a), used a large
number of participants (more than 60 participants in each
group), and thus increased the statistical power and sensi-
tivity to evidence of non-abstract representation.
Other evidence which challenges the existence of
abstract numerical representation and supports the
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existence of non-abstract representations comes from a
recent study by Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene et al.
2008). In their study, subjects from the Mundurucu
tribe, an indigenous Amazonian group with a reduced
numerical lexicon and little or no formal education, had
to indicate the location of a given number (e.g., 6 dots)
on a line segment with 1 dot at left and 10 dots at right.
The number to be mapped appeared in a random order
and in various forms (sets of dots, sequences of tones,
spoken Mundurucu words, or spoken Portuguese
words). For each number, adults and children pointed to
a screen location. The responses for both children and
adults were best fitted with a logarithmic curve (i.e., the
larger the numbers were, the more closely they were
mapped), a response that in the western culture is
usually characteristic of young children (Siegler & Booth
2004). In contrast, the responses of adults who have
been through a longer educational period were best
fitted with a linear curve. Importantly, performance
varied significantly with number notation within the
more educated group. Responses for Portuguese numerals
were best characterized by a linear function, but logarith-
mic for Mundurucu numerals and dot patterns from 1 to
10. These findings cannot be explained by an abstract
representation, as different verbal numbers such as the
Portuguese word QUATRO and the Mundurucu word
EBADIPDIP donate the same number (FOUR) and
should have led to similar mapping of the numbers inde-
pendent of their notations.
Some evidence for non-abstract representations comes
from replications of classic effects. For example, a recent
study examined the effect of different notations on the
SNARC effect (Hung et al. 2008). In this study, the partici-
pants were asked to make a parity judgement, similar to
the study by Nuerk et al. (2005) that we described
earlier (sect. 4, and Fig. 1a). While the numerical infor-
mation in the study by Nuerk et al. (2005) could appear
as digits, German words, auditory German words, or as
on a dice, the numerical information in Hung et al.
(2008) appeared in three different notations: digits,
which appeared horizontally in text, Chinese numerical
words in the simple form (e.g., —), and in the complex
form (e.g., ), which are presented in vertical text.
Hung et al. did find that the SNARC was affected by the
numerical notation, as indicated by the interaction
between the magnitude category and the responding
hand (i.e., the SNARC effect) and notation. This inter-
action was due to the SNARC effect only for digits.
Inspired by previous studies that found the SNARC
effect also with vertically aligned manual responses
(faster responses to small numbers with bottom-hand
key responses than with top-hand key responses, and
faster responses to large numbers with the top-hand key
than with the bottom-hand key) (Gevers et al. 2006a; Ito
& Hatta 2004; Schwarz & Keus 2004), they examined
the effect of notation on this vertical SNARC effect.
They found a consistent SNARC for the Chinese verbal
numbers, but not for the other notations. The results
might indicate, as Hung et al. suggested, that the represen-
tation of numbers in space is influenced, if not deter-
mined, by the dominant reading/writing experience. It is
an open question why Nuerk et al. (2005) obtained a
null result for the interaction between the SNARC effect
and notation. Different subjects, cultures, and stimuli,
might contribute to the discrepancy between the studies.
Nevertheless, the current study shows that different nota-
tions lead to different mapping of numbers in space. As
mapping of numbers in space was shown to take place
during the numerical representation (Mapelli et al. 2003;
Zorzi et al. 2002), or even later, during the response selec-
tion (Gevers et al. 2006b), this result indicates that differ-
ent notations do not converge into an abstract, single-
representation, at least at the level of the numerical rep-
resentation, and maybe even later.
Koechlin et al. (1999) conducted several experiments
on priming and subliminal priming. In these experiments
the subjects were asked to compare a stimulus (e.g., the
number 4) to the number 5, which served as a standard.
The numbers could appear as digits, verbal numbers,
or numerosity. Although most of the findings by the
authors were compatible with the abstract representation
view (i.e., they did not find an interaction between dis-
tance and notation), the authors also obtained some
results that are more in line with the non-abstract rep-
resentation view. For example, in one experiment they
used verbal numbers and digits. Although they did not
find an interaction between notation and distance under
regular priming, they obtained this interaction under
subliminal priming (which might reduce subjective
expectancy/strategies). In another experiment, they used
numbers in digits or numerosity notations. They found
an interaction between notation and quantity priming
(reduction in RT as the numerical distance between the
prime and target reduced), in both regular and subliminal
priming. These results indicate that there are different
representations of digits, verbal numbers, and numerosity.
Subsequently, Koechlin et al. proposed the existence
of separate notation-specific representations of quantity
that converge at a post-representational stage of proces-
sing. It is important to note that they assumed that these
distinct representations are revealed only under a
demanding temporal condition (e.g., subliminal priming
in which the prime is presented for as little as 66 msec).
Nevertheless, this position has been ignored by most
researchers in the field in favour of the abstract represen-
tation viewpoint.
Another effect which shows that numerical represen-
tation is not abstract is the compatibility effect (Nuerk
et al. 2001; 2004a; 2004b; Wood et al. 2006b). The compat-
ibility effect indicates that when people are comparing two
two-digit numbers they are faster to compare the numbers
if both the units and decades of a given number are
systematically smaller or larger. For example people will
be faster to compare the number 42 vs. 57 (4 , 5, and
2 , 7) than 47 vs. 62 (4 , 6, but 7 . 2). This effect
seems to be independent of the distance effect (in both
examples the distance effect is equal) (Nuerk et al. 2001;
2004b) or response selection (Nuerk et al. 2004a). This
effect indicates that the numerical representation is not
unitary, even within a single value (Dehaene et al. 1990),
but might incorporate additional representations for tens
and units. Importantly, the compatibility effect seems
to be modulated as a function of notation. That is, the
compatibility effect is smaller for verbal numbers than
for digits (Nuerk et al. 2002).
Further support for the non-abstract view comes from a
recent developmental study. Holloway and Ansari (2009)
collected the reading and mathematical achievements of
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children at the ages of 6 and 8 years. The mathematical
examination required the participants to answer as many
single-digit addition, subtraction, and multiplication pro-
blems as possible within a 3-minute period. The reading
skills were tested using a letter–word identification in
which the participants needed to correctly read real
words aloud to the experimenter, and word attack subtests,
which required them to correctly pronounce pseudo-
words. Holloway and Ansari correlated these scores with
the distance effect that was observed when these children
compared numbers in digits (symbolic) or squares (non-
symbolic) notations. The abstract representation would
predict that the distance effect independent of notation
might correlate with mathematical achievement. In con-
trast, the distance effect was only correlated with math-
ematical achievement (but not reading achievements)
when the numerical notation was in digit form. In contrast,
the distance effect when numbers appeared as squares did
not predict mathematical achievements. Moreover, they
also found an interaction between distance and notation,
and a lack of correlation between the distance effect for
digits and squares. These results clearly suggest that differ-
ent developmental trajectories underlie the representation
of symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude.
However, Holloway and Ansari interpreted these findings
as resulting from a better mapping between digits and
numerical magnitudes in children with better mathemat-
ical achievement, despite the fact that a better mapping
of digits to abstract representation can explain overall
faster RTs in children with better mathematical achieve-
ment, but cannot explain the differences in the distance
effect, as the symbolic distance effect occurs at the level
of the representation (Dehaene 1996; Schwarz & Ische-
beck 2000) or even later, during response selection
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; Link 1990; Van Opstal
et al. 2008a; Verguts & Fias 2004), but certainly not
earlier.
Other differences between different numerical nota-
tions have been found when stimuli have been processed
automatically. However, in these cases the explanations
provided considered only what was consistent with
the abstract view. For example, Fias (2001) used the
SNARC effect to examine the processing of verbal
numbers. A SNARC effect was observed when the partici-
pants were asked to make a parity judgement, but was not
found when verbal numbers were processed automati-
cally, that is, when the participants were asked to
monitor the occurrence of certain phonemes of verbal
numbers (i.e., whether there was an /e/ sound in the
name of the written verbal number). Notably, in a previous
study, the SNARC effect was observed for both parity and
phoneme monitoring tasks with digits (Fias et al. 1996).
These findings suggest that under unintentional proces-
sing, the spatial representation of the two notations
might differ. However, Fias (2001) suggested that this
difference between digits and verbal numbers was a
result of inhibition of the semantic route by the non-
semantic route only in the case of verbal numbers.
Other studies also found a dissociation between digits
and verbal numbers; however, these studies used naming
tasks (Fias et al. 2001b; Ischebeck 2003). Compared to
manual tasks, naming tasks are prone to include verbal/
phonological processes, because words are the preferred
output format for naming (Dehaene 1992). However,
this explanation cannot account for the differences
between different numerical notations in the studies that
we described earlier, as they all required a manual
response (Cohen Kadosh 2008a; Dehaene & Akhavein
1995; Dehaene et al. 2008; Droit-Volet et al. 2008;
Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008; Ito & Hatta 2003). Thus, it
might be that the differences between the notations
reflect, at least partly, non-abstract representations,
rather than solely preferred output format for naming
(Dehaene 1992).
Neuroimaging studies that have employed the size con-
gruity paradigm using a single notation (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2007c; Kaufmann et al. 2005; Pinel et al. 2004;
Tang et al. 2006a) found activity associated with interfer-
ence between digits and physical size in the IPS (i.e.,
larger BOLD signal change for an incongruent condition
vs. congruent condition). However, when different nota-
tions are used (Ansari et al. 2006b; Shuman & Kanwisher
2004) these interference effects are not seen in the IPS,
thus supporting the idea of non-abstract representation.
Numbers are apprehended automatically and even pas-
sively viewing them can activate a sense of magnitude, and
therefore modulate neural activation in the IPS (Cantlon
et al. 2006; Piazza et al. 2004). This is an important issue
because at least one previous study has shown that the
activation in the IPS during intentional numerical proces-
sing can be due to response selection rather than numeri-
cal representation (Go¨bel et al. 2004). This methodological
confound may therefore explain IPS activation that is
attributed to numerical processing (Eger et al. 2003; Nac-
cache & Dehaene 2001a; Pinel et al. 2001) when similar
response selection demands are associated with different
types of representation, a proposition that is in line with
recent studies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; Van Opstal
et al. 2008a). Eger and colleagues (Eger et al. 2003), for
example, used a numerical target detection task to avoid
using direct magnitude judgements. In this task, the nine
subjects were presented with numbers between 1 and 9
and required to detect, via a button press, the appearance
of a target number (e.g., 7). Numbers have been found
to activate the IPS independent of modality (visual or
auditory presentation). However, this task required the
subjects to:
1. Process the numbers intentionally.
2. Look for a target number independent of modality.
Given that the numerical representation is flexible and
biased by task requirements (e.g., Fischer & Rottmann
2005; Gertner et al. 2009; Shaki & Petrusic 2005) this
may lead the subjects to create a modality-independent
response set.
3. Prepare a similar response selection for each type of
representation: The closer the number is to the target the
more likely it will be that the activity associated with
response selection is similar across stimulus types (i.e.,
pressing the button when detecting the target). For
example, if the target number is 7 (“SEVEN”), 6 (“SIX”)
is numerically closer to 7 than 1 (“ONE”). This idea has
been confirmed by behavioural results (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2008b; Van Opstal et al. 2008a).
To examine whether numerical representation is
abstract and independent of task requirements, two
recent studies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007b; Piazza et al.
2007) employed passive viewing in a modified adaptation
paradigm (Grill-Spector et al. 2006a; Sawamura et al.
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2006). Using this paradigm, the repetition of the same
stimulus reduces the responsiveness of single neurons in
monkeys (Sawamura et al. 2006) and the BOLD signal
in humans (Grill-Spector et al. 2006a). In humans,
BOLD signal adaptation occurs when the stimulus
changes indicate that the neurons are not affected by the
stimulus-specific adapting attribute. In contrast, BOLD
signal recovery from the state of adaptation implies that
different neuronal populations are activated and that
these neurons are therefore differentially sensitive to
some property of the adaptation and test stimuli. Recently,
this paradigm has become popular in fMRI research, par-
ticularly because of the claim that it provides improved
spatial resolution by revealing sub-voxel effects (Grill-
Spector et al. 2006a). Therefore, the adaptation paradigm
can be used to address some of the limitations discussed
earlier, such as spatial resolution, subjects’ strategies,
and response selection. In the study by Piazza and col-
leagues (Piazza et al. 2007), for example, subjects passively
viewed dot arrays or digits that varied in numerical value; a
quantity presented to induce signal adaptation was fol-
lowed by a deviation in the quantity to result in signal
recovery. The abstract hypothesis suggests that similar
adaptation and recovery should occur, irrespective of
which combinations of dot arrays and digits were used at
the adaptation and test phases. The logic behind this sug-
gestion is that both notations denote the same numerical
quantity, and therefore the same neuronal correlate
should be sensitive to the numerical quantity, irrespective
of its format (Dehaene et al. 1998; 2003). The results,
however, challenged the abstract representation: that is,
there was an interaction between notation and recovery
in the left and right parietal lobes. Moreover, the abstract
representation posits that the recovery of the BOLD signal
following the deviant stimuli should be of the same magni-
tude, again, irrespective of notation. That is, greater recov-
ery should follow large numerical deviation (e.g., the
number 50 after constant presentation of quantities
between 17 and 19) in comparison to small numerical
deviation (e.g., the number 20 after constant presentation
of quantities between 17 and 19), and the magnitude of the
recovery should not interact with notation. This again was
clearly not the case; the left IPS, showed an interaction
between notation and recovery that was modulated as a
function of numerical distance. Although the authors
focused more on the similarity observed in the right IPS
between the notations, as indicated by the failure to find
a significant interaction between notation, recovery, and
numerical distance, the interaction between notation and
recovery in both left and right IPS, and particularly the
interaction between notation, recovery, and numerical
distance in the left IPS (Fig. 2a), lend themselves to an
explanation in terms of non-abstract representation.
Cohen Kadosh and colleagues (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2007b) presented digits and verbal numbers in pairs. The
pair could have an identical quantity (e.g., 8/eight after
8/eight), or a different quantity (e.g., 8/eight after 4/four).
Adaptation was identified as the difference in the BOLD
signal between pairs that did or did not differ in quantity.
The results again indicated a deviation from abstract rep-
resentation. Namely, the right IPS, but not the left IPS,
showed an interaction between adaptation and notation. In
Figure 2. Evidence of non-abstract representations from recent neuroimaging studies. (A) From the left, the recovery effect following
the adaptation period for dot arrays and digits due to numerical deviations (Far, Close) was modulated by notation in the left IPS
(turquoise circle). (B) The right IPS shows an adaptation effect (different quantity minus same quantity) for digits, but not for
words or mixed notation. (Adapted from Cohen Kadosh et al. [2007b] and Piazza et al. [2007] with permission.) A color version of
this figure is available online at: www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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particular, the adaptation in the right IPS appeared only
when a digit preceded a digit (Fig. 2b). The results again
challenge the idea that numbers are represented in an
abstract fashion, in this case, in the right IPS, and are best
explained in terms of non-abstract representation.
Thus, two studies, including one that purports to
support abstract representation, reveal notation-depen-
dent effects in the two key areas – the right and left
IPS – associated with different numerical representations.
One might suggest that the lack of interaction between
notation and adaptation in the left IPS in Cohen Kadosh
et al.’s (2007b) study indicates the existence of an abstract
representation. We examined the involvement of the left
IPS in abstract representation by using a different tech-
nique, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), together
with an adaptation paradigm. This innovative combination
of TMS and adaptation (termed TMSA) significantly
increases the functional resolution and allows one to dif-
ferentially stimulate distinct but spatially overlapping
neural populations within a stimulated region (Silvanto
& Muggleton 2008a; Silvanto et al. 2007). The paradigm
is based on findings that the effects of TMS are deter-
mined by the initial neural activation state, with attributes
encoded by the less active/excitable neural populations
within the stimulated region being more susceptible to
the effects of TMS. Thus, by using adaptation to manip-
ulate neural activation states prior to the application of
TMS, one can control which neural populations are stimu-
lated by TMS (for reviews see Silvanto & Muggleton
2008b; Silvanto et al. 2008). In our experiment the subjects
were adapted to the digit 7, which repeatedly appeared on
the screen for 45 seconds in different locations and fonts.
Following this adaptation period, the subjects had to
decide in a same-different task whether two numbers,
digits, or verbal numbers on the screen are perceptually
the same or different, while we stimulated the IPS with
TMS during the period of 180, 280, and 380 msec post-
stimulus presentation – a timing during which numerical
representation processes are believed to take place
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007c; Dehaene 1996; Libertus
et al. 2007; Szucs et al. 2007; Turconi et al. 2004). Accord-
ing to the abstract representation view, the participants’
decision time would be affected by the adapted number
7, independent of the numerical notation. In contrast, if
separate representations for digits and verbal numbers
exist, as the non-abstract representation view predicts,
one should expect to find that only the representation
for digits was affected. The latter hypothesis was borne
out. Only digits were affected by TMS to the left IPS,
while words were not affected. Moreover, the TMS
effect was most effective when the digit 7 appeared, and
was attenuated as numerical proximity decreased. This
was not the case for verbal numbers (Fig. 3). In a
second experiment, the subjects were adapted to verbal
numbers rather than digits. The results were exactly the
opposite from the previous experiment, thus completing
a double dissociation; TMS to the left IPS was most effec-
tive when the adapted verbal number appeared, and was
attenuated as numerical proximity decreased. This exper-
iment shows that non-abstract representations for digit
and verbal numbers exist also in the left IPS (Cohen
Kadosh et al., submitted b). These apparent differences
between the neuroimaging findings and the current
TMS results are most likely to be rooted in the fact that
TMS and fMRI yield different measures of cause and
correlation, respectively (Walsh & Pascual-Leone 2003).
7. Multiple representations of number
The fMRA findings in Piazza et al. (2007) and Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2007b) and the TMSA results illustrate
the idea that improved spatial resolution and automatic
processing (or controlling for task-related responses) can
uncover non-abstract representations that are otherwise
masked. Notably, these studies used different notations,
different ranges of numbers, different designs, and differ-
ent techniques: the generalizability of these findings is
therefore likely to be high. Differences in the results
between these studies are also apparent. The results in
Piazza et al. (2007) indicate that numerical representation
for dots and digits is non-abstract in the left IPS, as illus-
trated by the interaction between notation and recovery
(which was also significant for the right IPS) and notation,
recovery, and numerical distance. In contrast, the study by
Cohen Kadosh et al. (2007b) points towards the opposite
conclusion, that is, that numbers in verbal number and
digit notations are represented non-abstractly in the
right IPS. However, the TMSA results showed that in
the left IPS, too, numbers in verbal number and digit nota-
tions are non-abstractly represented. It seems clear, then,
that non-abstract representation may be a feature of either
IPS, and across different notations.
However, the parietal lobes in the fMRI studies also
showed some pattern that at first sight supports the exist-
ence of abstract representation. There are four possibili-
ties for this pattern:
1. Non-abstract and abstract representations coexist.
2. While an interaction between notations is a strong
indication of the existence of non-abstract representation,
the lack of such interaction does not necessarily indicate
the existence of abstract representation, because it is
based on an absence of evidence.
3. Piazza et al. (2007) did control for task-related
responses, but explicitly asked the subjects to pay attention
to the quantity conveyed by the stimuli, and they were
informed about the different formats and their approxi-
mate values. Moreover, immediately prior to the scanning
session, subjects were shown approximately four exem-
plars of each numerosity (17:20 and 47:50 dots) and
informed about their approximate range (20 and 50,
respectively) in order to calibrate them to the respective
value (Izard & Dehaene 2008). Therefore, one cannot
be sure if at least some of the subjects still processed the
numbers intentionally (e.g., noting themselves that the
number 49 was changed to 18 dots).
4. As originally pointed out by Piazza and colleagues
(Piazza et al. 2007; for similar view, see also Tudusciuc &
Nieder 2007), to explain the cross-adaptation that they
observed, the apparent support for abstract representation
within the parietal region might be due to non-abstract
numerical representations that are characterised by separate
but highly interconnected subassemblies of neurons. There-
fore, when notations are mixed, activation of one given
population (e.g., digits) would quickly spread to the other
population (e.g., dots), thus leading to cross-notation adap-
tation in the absence of real abstract representation. This
idea gains support from findings in the primate brain. For
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh: Numerical representation in the parietal lobes
322 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:3/4
example, based on fMRI studies in humans it was believed
that both covert and overt shift of attention are subserved
by the same mechanism in the frontal eye fields (FEF)
(Corbetta et al. 1998). However, single-neuron recordings
in monkeys, which provide better spatial and temporal resol-
utions, demonstrated that covert and overt shift of attention
in the FEF are associated with different neural populations
(Sato & Schall 2003), and that these dissociable populations
are functionally interconnected (Schafer & Moore 2007).
8. Resolving the resolution problem
Single-cell neurophysiology offers better temporal and
spatial resolution than human neuroimaging, and several
recent studies have reported neuronal responses to quan-
tity in the monkey brain (Nieder & Miller 2003; Roitman
et al. 2007), which resemble the predictions of numerical-
related behavioural effects and computational models
(Verguts & Fias 2004).
Neuronal populations coding for numbers are highly
distributed in the IPS, and also highly overlapping with
representations of other magnitudes (for a neuroimaging
meta-analysis, see Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f), therefore
making it difficult to disentangle numerical representation
from other magnitudes. However, a recent single-cell neu-
rophysiology study provided evidence for the existence of
neurons that are specialized for different magnitudes
(Tudusciuc & Nieder 2007).
Another study that examined whether numerical
representation depends on the format of presentation
Figure 3. Non-abstract representations for digits and verbal numbers in the left IPS. In this TMS-adaptation experiment, the subjects
were adapted to the digit 7. Top panel: Following this adaptation period the subjects had to decide whether a pair of numbers is
perceptually same or different, while TMS was delivered to their IPS. Bottom panel: Adaptation was appreciated by the subtraction
of the RT from a baseline condition, in which during the adaptation period the symbol # was presented instead of the digit 7 (i.e.,
no adaptation for numbers). TMS modulated only digits but not verbal numbers, as indicated by the interaction between notation
and distance from the adapted number. This effect was maximal for the adapted digit, and reduced as the numerical distance from
the adapted number increased. The straight white line shows the linear trend for the digits (which was significant), while the dotted
white line shows the trend for the verbal numbers (which was not significant). A color version of this figure is available online at
www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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demonstrated that in the macaque parietal cortex
responses to the same quantity are initially format-
dependent (Nieder et al. 2006); different neuronal popu-
lations discharge to sequential presentation, while others dis-
charge to simultaneous presentation of numerosity. At a later
stage during the delay period, these format-dependencies
converge to a shared representation of quantity in the parie-
tal cortex. This shared representation may be due to recur-
rent processing in the prefrontal cortex, which was not
examined in the current study, but it showed longer
latency and greater activity during the memory-delay
period compared to the parietal cortex in a previous study
(Nieder & Miller 2004). This suggests that the parietal
lobe is equipped with primary non-abstract representations
that are later transformed into a shared representation, poss-
ibly due to the intentional task requirement. Recently,
Diester and Nieder (2007) showed that the neuronal popu-
lations for dots and digits in the parietal cortex of monkeys
are notation-dependent. After training the monkeys to dis-
criminate dot quantities, the monkeys were trained to associ-
ate digits with their corresponding dots (e.g., the digit 2 with
two dots). Similar to humans, the behavioural results for
digits and dots showed a similar function. However,
Diester and Nieder (2007) found that whereas many
neurons in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) were activated by
digits, dots, or by both digits and dots, neurons in the
parietal cortex were activated primarily for either digits or
dots (Fig. 4). Further training may lead to different
representations (e.g., further specialisation, or alternatively
a convergence towards a shared representation) and awaits
further exploration. Of course, this result cannot give
us 100% confidence that the basic representation of
numbers in the human parietal lobes is non-abstract,
because of the comparative question. However, it shows
that even after months of training and although digits
were explicitly associated with their corresponding dots, it
is possible for neurons in the parietal lobes to be
non-abstract. This result, together with the behavioural
and neuroimaging data in humans (sect. 6), supports the
idea that non-abstract representation is the basic represen-
tation in the parietal lobes.
9. Prefrontal cortex and number: Operations not
representations
We have confined our discussion so far to the parietal lobes,
while not discussing the PFC. Some might argue that the
PFC in the Diester and Nieder (2007) study showed
some pattern that might be compatible with the idea of
abstract representation (although one should note that the
majority of the neurons there showed activation that is in
Figure 4. Non-abstract numerical representations in the monkey’s IPS. Two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained initially
in a delayed match-to-sample protocol to discriminate small numbers of dots (between 1 and 4). Later, over several months they learned
to associate visual shapes (the digits 1, 2, 3, and 4) with corresponding numerosities. Finally, both notations appeared in a randomised
manner within an experimental session. (A) Behavioural performance for Monkey #1 for dots and shapes. The curves show how often
the monkeys judged the first test and sample to be equal. The performance to discriminate dots or shapes between 1 and 4 was quite
high and comparable. (B) Lateral view of a monkey brain. The red circle represents the location of recording sites in the parietal lobe.
(C) Venn diagram summarising the results in the IPS. Numbers correspond to the numbers of neurons selective for each class.
Association neurons indicate neurons that have similar tuning functions for the numerical values in both protocols; Numerosity
effect corresponds to neurons that were selective for a particular number; Type effect indicates neurons that were modulated by
non-numerical visuospatial properties (e.g., physical size, font). It appears that most of the neurons in the IPS were non-abstract, as
they showed selectivity for dots or shape (digits). In contrast, the amount of “abstract” neurons (coding both dots and shapes) was
negligible. AS ¼ arcuate sulcus; CS ¼ central sulcus; PS ¼ principal sulcus; STS ¼ superior temporal sulcus; LS ¼ lateral sulcus.
(Adapted from Diester and Nieder [2007]. A color version of this figure is available online at www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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line with non-abstract representation). In terms of number
research, the PFC has received less attention than the par-
ietal cortex, but it is increasingly being seen as important in
the field of numerical cognition, which starts mainly from
the observation of numerons (neurons which are number-
sensitive) in the PFC by Nieder and colleagues (Nieder
et al. 2002). There is no doubt that the PFC is involved in
numerical processing (for a recent review, see Ansari
2008). However, we argue that the PFC is not involved in
numerical representation, at least not in humans. The
PFC is important for some numerical operations, but not
representations (Duncan 2001; Revkin et al. 2008).
The cognitive system is replete with such dissociations
of cognitive operations and sensory representations – the
hippocampus, while important for reconstructing mem-
ories, does not contain the representations of the objects
in those memories; the PFC is involved in sequencing
behaviours, while not containing the representations of
each action in a sequence; the cerebellum is important
for skilled use of fingers and motor coordination, but its
role may be to support cognitive functions which are
implemented by other brain areas (Glickstein 2007;
Rosenbaum et al. 2001). There are several other reasons
for our emphasis on the parietal cortex.
First, in human adults, only the IPS shows number-
specific activation. This does not mean necessarily that
this area is solely active in response to the given process.
Posner (2003) encapsulates this view in another context
in which he refers to activations observed in the same
brain area under different task conditions:
Although it is not always easy to distinguish between a brain
area being specific for a domain or performing a computation
that is of particular importance for some domains, either can
underlie a form of modularity . . .. Thus these areas and
many others that have been described are modules in the
sense that they perform specific mental operations . . . some-
times the operations are within a single domain, but sometimes
they are more general. (Posner 2003, p. 450)
In line with this idea, parts of the IPS show number-specific
activation (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005; 2008c). This was not
found in the case of the PFC, which shows specificity for
non-numerical magnitudes rather than numbers (Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2005) or joint activation for numbers and
other magnitudes (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008c).
Second, the activation in the PFC may reflect other
factors than representation including training, working
memory, strategy application (Gilbert & Burgess 2008),
or changes in response strategy (although some of them
are also modulated by the parietal cortex, as was described
in sect. 5). For example, neurons in the PFC might
respond to dots and digits because there is a similar
response strategy for the digit 1 and the dot 1 when com-
paring them to other stimuli presented. Similarly, Tudus-
ciuc and Nieder (2007) have suggested that the PFC
activation might relate to other functions of the PFC
(e.g., cognitive control, working memory) that operates
on parietal lobe functions (Miller & Cohen 2001).
Third, neuropsychological studies have found that
neurological damage to the PFC leads to deficits in esti-
mation, not because of representation impairment, but
because of impairment at the level of translation from
semantic representation to output (Revkin et al. 2008).
Fourth, there seems to be a shift from relying on the
PFC during numerical processing to the IPS, as age
increases (Ansari & Dhital 2006; Ansari et al. 2005;
Cantlon et al. 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2006). This decrease
in the reliance on prefrontal regions, and the increase in
posterior specialized neuronal circuits, might relate to
increased reliability of processes of cognitive control,
attention, and working memory with age (Ansari 2008),
or might indicate the developmental transition into a
stage in which numerical representation becomes more
automatic, and therefore involves less PFC resources.
Fifth, in contrast to many studies that consistently found
that parietal damage leads to acalculia and basic numerical
processing deficits (Ashkenazi et al. 2008; Dehaene &
Cohen 1997; Delazer & Benke 1997; Delazer et al. 2006;
Lemer et al. 2003; Takayama et al. 1994; Van Harskamp
& Cipolotti 2001; Van Harskamp et al. 2002; Vuilleumier
et al. 2004), there is, at least to our knowledge, a lack of
consistent evidence of acalculia resulting from frontal
damage. In this respect, we do not refer to secondary acal-
culia – numerical difficulties due to non-numerical origin,
such as working memory problems (Doricchi et al.
2005) – but to a primary acalculia, which is rooted at the
level of the numerical representation.
Sixth, in monkeys, numerical information is first coded in
the parietal lobes, and only later in the prefrontal cortex.
This temporal lag is in line with our suggestion that the
PFC is involved in numerically-related processes, which
might be post-representational (Nieder & Miller 2004).
Still, in humans, it is possible that the PFC is involved in
numerical representation, rather than operation, during
early developmental stages. This idea is gaining support
from several neuroimaging studies that found PFC acti-
vation in children and infants during numerical tasks
(Ansari & Dhital 2006; Cantlon et al. 2006; Izard et al.
2008; Kaufmann et al. 2006). The idea that children acti-
vate brain regions that are outside the typical areas
activated in adulthood is not unique to the field of numeri-
cal cognition, and is observed in other fields. For example,
children represent faces in additional cortical areas to the
occipitotemporal network: occipital face area (Pitcher
et al. 2007), fusiform face area (Kanwisher et al. 1997),
and the superior temporal sulcus that are consistently
found in adults (Haxby et al. 2000), including the left
and right PFC (Gathers et al. 2004; Passarotti et al.
2003). (For a review, see Johnson et al. 2009.)
One of the reviewers rightly pointed out that in the
recent fMRI study by Piazza et al. (2007), which we dis-
cussed in section 6, PFC activation was observed as a func-
tion of numerical processing, although the (adult) subjects
passively processed the quantity. However, as was
described in section 7, in this study Piazza and colleagues
draw the attention of the subjects to the different numeri-
cal quantities, to the different formats, and to the change
that will occur.
Future studies should take into account the possibility
that the PFC activation, at least for human adults, might
not reflect number-specific representation, but other
functions that support or utilise numerical representation
in the parietal lobes.
10. Abstract after all?
Our primary intention in this article has been to question
the idea that the default numerical representation is
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abstract. We need, however, to account for the evidence
that points towards abstraction and against our view.
Assuming that abstract representation might after all
exist under certain conditions, our contention, following
Barsalou (2003), is that it occurs as a consequence of the
intentional processing of numbers, which leads to explicit
creation of connections between different notation-
specific representations. We also contend that this cross-
talk between notations occurs on-line on a task-by-task
basis, but does not exist off-line. We can do no better
than Barsalou’s words: “abstraction is simply a skill that
supports goal achievement in a particular situation”
(Barsalou 2003, p. 1184). We therefore suggest that
when numerical representation is probed automatically
(or implicitly), one will be more likely to find evidence
for different numerical representations. However, when
researchers use an intentional task, they might encourage
the subject to modify the default non-abstract represen-
tations. Similar examples can be extracted from the
mapping of numbers into space. There is good evidence
that we map numbers from left to right as numerical
value increases. However, under certain conditions one
can represent numbers in reverse format, from right
to left (Bachtold et al. 1998). Similarly, we argue that
humans do not, as a default, represent numbers abstractly,
but can adopt strategies that, in response to task con-
figuration and demands, can create real or apparent
abstraction.
As numerical representation is highly flexible, and not
static, what are the neural correlates for such represen-
tations? While the IPS shows a consistent modulation for
numerical quantity, in different paradigms and labs
(Ansari et al. 2006a; 2006b; Castelli et al. 2006; Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2005; 2007c; Fias et al. 2003; 2007; Pesenti
et al. 2000; Piazza et al. 2004; Tang et al. 2006a; Wood
et al. 2006b, for reviews, see Ansari 2008; Brannon 2006;
Cantlon et al. 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f;
Dehaene et al. 2003; Nieder 2005; Walsh 2003), other
brain areas outside the IPS also show involvement
during numerical processing – for example, the left pre-
central gyrus (Piazza et al. 2006; Pinel et al. 2004), the
right middle temporal gyrus (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005;
Pinel et al. 2001), the right superior temporal sulcus
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005), the right precentral gyrus
(Piazza et al. 2006), the cerebellum (Fias et al. 2003), or
the primary visual cortex, and the insula (Piazza et al.
2007). However, aside from the IPS, these areas did not
show a consistent activation across studies and tasks.
Therefore, the IPS may be the critical part of a distributed
and highly interconnected network of regions that gives
rise to the representation of numerical magnitude in
particular task contexts.
In his dual code hypothesis, Paivio (1971; for extensions
see Barsalou et al. 2008; Glaser 1992) suggested that
semantic knowledge is represented internally by linguistic
(verbal) and imagery (pictorial) codes, which involved
internal translation between them. Similar to our view
on numerical cognition, he proposed that the involvement
of each code depends on the task demands. Generally,
whereas picture stimuli tend to activate imagery codes,
word stimuli are coded initially by the linguistic codes.
Paivio further suggested that the dual code of linguistic
and imagistic representations might underlie all of cogni-
tive activities.
Our current cognitive neuro-anatomical approach is
partly inspired by cognitive processes as described by
the dual code theory and its extensions. Similarly, we
propose that dual codes are active during numerical rep-
resentation. Instead of the terminology of linguistic and
imagery codes we use the terminology of automatic and
intentional codes, respectively. At the first stage, there is
an automatic activation of the numerical quantity that is
modality- and notation-specific (similar to the linguistic
representations in the Language and Situated Simulation
model; for a review, see Barsalou et al. 2008) in the IPS.
This processing is crude and not as refined (Banks et al.
1976; Cohen Kadosh 2008b; Tzelgov et al. 1992). Later,
the representation of numerical information in the IPS
can be further refined. This refinement depends on the
time of the activation, intentional processing, task
demands, and is resource-dependent. The representation
at this stage can be transferred to an on-line representation
by a few, the majority, or the entire neuronal population in
the IPS, which was activated at an earlier point during
automatic numerical representation. This transition from
automatic to intentional representation can be subserved
by the PFC neural circuitry that is malleable, and its
activity reflects learned associations and rules (Duncan
2001) (e.g., that 5 and FIVE have the same quantity)
(see Fig. 5). Note, that because dot patterns are con-
sidered prelinguistic, the terminology of linguistic code
cannot be applied here. As for the imagery code, which
according to the dual code hypothesis is pictogram, a ten-
tative suggestion is that in the western culture this will be a
digit, as it is the most used pictogram for numbers in the
western culture.
Figure 5. Automatic (gray) and intentional (black) numerical
representations. Automatic numerical always precedes the
intentional numerical processing. However, the height, shape,
and offset of the two distributions are not fixed, and are
context- and task-dependent. The transition from automatic to
intentional representation in the IPS can be subserved by the
PFC neural circuitry that is malleable, and its activity reflects
learned associations and rules (Duncan 2001). Note that this
division also mirrors the separation of approximate and exact
systems with the former being fast and automatic, and the later
slow and intentional. This model is similar to the Language and
Situated Simulation model, in which the automatic and
intentional representations correspond to linguistic and situated
simulation systems (Barsalou et al. 2008).
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh: Numerical representation in the parietal lobes
326 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:3/4
As the occurrence of automatic processing per se,
without intentional processing, is rather limited
(Perlman & Tzelgov 2006), the height, shape, and offset
of the distributions of the automatic and intentional
numerical representations that are presented in Figure 5
are not assumed to be fixed, and are context- and task-
dependent. For example, in some tasks the intentional
processing can be more dominant than the automatic pro-
cessing. Thus, the two distributions are only examples and
can take place in many different forms, and in some con-
ditions without or with minimal intentional processing.
This model can explain the different behavioural and
neuroimaging results that we reviewed in favour of non-
abstract representations (automatic numerical proces-
sing), and those that might imply abstract representation
(intentional numerical processing). For example, when
the intentional representation is more dominant, there is
a need for increasing statistical power in order to
uncover the non-abstract numerical representation that
occurs during the previous stage and is masked by the
intentional processing that creates an on-line abstract rep-
resentation. In addition, when no intentional processing is
needed, the detection of non-abstract representation is
easier to observe. Furthermore, this model can further
explain the distinct and shared representations for
general magnitude in the IPS (Cantlon et al. 2009;
Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f; Walsh 2003), which corre-
sponds in the current case also to automatic and inten-
tional, respectively.
As one of the reviewers pointed out, our terminology of
initial automatic processing that is followed by an inten-
tional and deliberate processing with increased
precision can profitably extend the positions in the field
of conceptual processing as reviewed by Glaser (1992)
and Barsalou et al. (2008). In short, Solomon and
Barsalou (2004; see Barsalou et al. 2008, for a review of
further studies) suggested that when task conditions
allow the usage of shallow processing, participants use a
superficial linguistic strategy. However, when a deeper
conceptual processing is needed they use simulation
(imagery), which occurs after the linguistic code. This
interplay between linguistic and simulation codes can
be modulated by automatic and intentional processing,
respectively. Moreover, our terminology helps explain
effects in other domains such as in language comprehen-
sion, conceptual processing, social processes, and edu-
cation (for examples, see Barsalou et al. 2008). For
instance, children with developmental dyscalculia might
experience difficulties in processing numbers because
of deficits in automatic numerical processing (Rubinsten
& Henik 2005; 2006). According to the current frame-
work, this problem leads to a greater reliance on inten-
tional processing, which leaves, in turn, less resources
for manipulations when they are facing more complicated
computation, or when they need to learn more advanced
strategies (Butterworth 2004). However, one important
distinction between our model and other modifications
of the dual-code is that our neuro-anatomical framework
includes the IPS, a critical area for numerical cognition.
Other fields might depend on other brain areas/networks
(e.g., temporal structures during language tasks), but we
assume that the information processing, namely, the tran-
sition from automatic to intentional processing, is based
on similar principles.
11. Future directions
The question of specialisation of numerical representation
has been relatively neglected, compared to other functions
such as face, colour, or object perception (Cohen Kadosh
& Johnson 2007). Several possible directions of research
can remedy this.
1. Single-cell neurophysiology. Following Diester and
Nieder’s (2007) study, it is important to examine how
learning affects numerical representation in the parietal
lobe. It might be that after longer training, neurons in
the parietal lobe will show activation for both digits and
dots. However, following the interactive specialisation
approach (Cohen Kadosh & Johnson 2007; Johnson
2001; Johnson et al. 2009), we believe that learning will
lead to neuronal specialisation, just as observed with
magnitude processing (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f;
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh 2008; Holloway & Ansari 2008).
Another direction will be to use automatic and intentional
tasks to examine whether the abstract representation in
the prefrontal lobes is a function of natural representation
or a result of strategies employed according to task
requirements.
†
† Developmental studies. By using habituation para-
digms with sequential and simultaneous presentations, it
is possible to examine whether infants habituate to the
same quantity independent of format. However, one possi-
bility is that the trajectory of numerical representation
follows the same principle as other types of magnitude
representations (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f; Holloway &
Ansari 2008), and other brain functions (Cohen Kadosh
& Johnson 2007), and follows a trajectory from non-
specific to increasingly specialised representations as a
function of learning.
III. Automaticity and intentionality. The passive task
used in different adaptation paradigms also has some limit-
ations; the experimenter cannot know if some subjects
decide to attend to and act on the numbers (Perlman &
Tzelgov 2006). Studying numerical representation by
using automatic processing (e.g., Stroop-like paradigms)
can yield a description of the numerical representation
that is not dependent on specific task demands. Adopting
this approach of contrasting the automatic and intentional
processing of numerical information with different nota-
tions will yield a better characterisation of the abstract
and non-abstract representations, and the conditions
under which each representation is activated.
FOUR. Neuroimaging. Combination of techniques
with good temporal resolution (magnetoencephalography,
ERP) and spatial resolution (fMRI) can shed light on the
model that we presented in Figure 5. These techniques
will allow the detection of the representations under auto-
matic processing, and the interplay between the represen-
tation under automatic and intentional representations in
the IPS, and the possible recurrent processing from the
PFC, in the case of intentional processing. Aside from
fMRI, multivariate pattern recognition, an analysis that
uses pattern classification algorithms to decode fMRI
activity that is distributed across multiple voxels, can also
provides a means to disentangle different neuronal sub-
strates as a function of numerical representation.
5. Neuronal modelling.Not surprisingly, the issue of non-
abstract representation has been neglected, possibly because
of the salience and convenience of the view that numbers are
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represented in an abstract fashion. However, a few studies
have addressed the issue of abstract representation, at least
indirectly. Some of them lead to the conclusion that the prop-
erties of numerical representation for dots and digits might
not be identical (Verguts & Fias 2004; Verguts et al. 2005).
A clear direction for future research in this field is to
examine issues such as task-dependent representation, or
typical and atypical development of numerical represen-
tations as a function of interaction between brain areas
(Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith 2002). A great deal is known
about the behaviour of numerical systems and we also have
good characterisations of the anatomy and functions of key
areas to provide constraints on models.
12. Conclusion
The idea that numerical representation is not abstract has,
in our view, been cast aside too readily. In contrast, the
idea that number representation is abstract has become a
premature default position that is not as strongly supported
by the evidence on which it is based as its predominance
may suggest. Here we have provided evidence from behav-
ioural and neuroimaging studies in humans to single-cell
neurophysiology in monkeys that cannot be explained by
the abstract numerical representation, as they clearly indi-
cate that numerical representation is non-abstract. It is an
open question if numerical representation, at least under
certain conditions, is abstract at all. We therefore suggest
that before sleep-walking into orthodoxy the alternative
idea is revitalised and given further consideration. Future
studies should take into account the different methodologi-
cal and theoretical arguments that we have raised in this
target article, before concluding that numerical represen-
tation is abstract, as well as any other conclusions regarding
the commonalities between processes.
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